New York courts have consistently held that issues of comparative fault are often for the trier of fact, particularly where the record contains conflicting testimony. The Appellate Division, Second Department’s recent decision in Ibas v. Peralta, 237 A.D.3d 680 (App. Div. 2d Dept’ 2025) reversing summary judgment in favor of a defendant driver underscores this principle and also addresses the “serious injury” threshold under Insurance Law §5102(d).

The plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle operated by a nonparty driver who attempted to make a left turn at an intersection when the defendant’s vehicle collided with it. The plaintiff commenced an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in the accident. Following discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending that the nonparty driver’s failure to yield the right-of-way in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1141 was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether she sustained a “serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d).

The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion, finding that the nonparty driver’s conduct was the sole cause of the accident, and denied the plaintiff’s serious injury motion as academic. On appeal, the Second Department reversed.

The Appellate Division reiterated the well-settled rule that there may be more than one proximate cause of an accident, and that a defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that he or she was free from fault in the happening of the accident. While Vehicle and Traffic Law §1141 requires a left-turning driver to yield the right-of-way, a driver who has the right-of-way is not absolved of all responsibility and may still be found comparatively negligent if he or she failed to use reasonable care to avoid the collision.

Here, the defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden. Deposition testimony from the defendant, the plaintiff, and the nonparty driver contained conflicting accounts regarding key issues, including whether the defendant was speeding and whether his vehicle was so close to the intersection as to constitute an “immediate hazard” at the time the nonparty driver initiated the left turn. Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, this evidence raised triable issues of fact that precluded summary judgment, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers. This decision serves as a reminder that right-of-way arguments do not automatically entitle a defendant to summary judgment where there is evidence suggesting possible comparative fault.

Giulia R. Marino, Esq.